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England and Wales1:  
Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences  
Wendy Sigle-Rushton2  
Abstract  
For nearly three decades, the total fertility rate in England and Wales has remained high 
relative to other European countries, and stable at about 1.7 births per woman. In this 
chapter, we examine trends in both period and cohort fertility throughout the twentieth 
century, and demonstrate some important differences across demographic and social 
groups in the timing and quantum of fertility. Breaking with a market-oriented and 
laissez-faire approach to work and family issues, the last 10 years have seen the 
introduction of new social and economic policies aimed at providing greater support to 
families with children. However, the effect of the changes is likely to be limited to 
families on the lower end of the income scale. Rather than facilitating work and 
parenthood, some policies create incentives for a traditional gendered division of 
labour. Fertility appears to have remained stable despite, rather than because of, 
government actions.  
                                                          
1 The United Kingdom comprises the contiguous regions of Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) 
along with Northern Ireland. Its political system is relatively complex. To varying degrees, different regions 
have different legislative powers and different regions take responsibility for collecting and disseminating 
statistics. As a result, statistical information is sometimes collected and reported for the United Kingdom as a 
whole (covering Northern Ireland and Great Britain), sometimes just for Great Britain, and, in an increasing 
number of cases, separately for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  This paper focuses 
predominantly on England and Wales, which account for the majority – more than 85 percent -- of the UK 
population. 
2 Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, 
WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Email: W.Sigle-Rushton@lse.ac.uk 
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1. Introduction  
In 2001 the total fertility rate (TFR) for England and Wales reached an historic low of 
1.63. It has, however, increased every year since and in 2006 reached 1.87 -- its highest 
level since 1980 (Office for National Statistics 2007a). These recent fluctuations have 
attracted a large amount of media attention, much of which belies the fact that fertility 
has actually remained fairly stable. In the period since 1980, the average value of the 
TFR was around 1.76, falling below 1.70 and exceeding 1.83 in only six of the 27 years 
(see Figure 1 below). Moreover, the total fertility rates in England and Wales have been 
relatively high within the European context. Recently Sobotka (2004) suggested that 
England and Wales might, together with the Northern European countries, France and 
Ireland, form a “high fertility belt” within Europe.  
Demographically, England and Wales are well placed to deal with the challenges 
of population ageing. In each year of the twentieth century, except 1976, the population 
of the United Kingdom as a whole experienced growth from natural increase, and this 
looks set to continue. Relatively high fertility combined with high rates of immigration 
mean that population growth is projected for several decades. The latest population 
projections for England and Wales estimate that the 2006 population of 53.7 million 
people will increase by nearly 10 million in the period up to 2031. Longer-term 
projections show the populations of both England and Wales continuing to rise at least 
until 2056 (Bray 2008).3 Taking into account planned increases in the state pension age, 
projections for the UK as a whole suggest that the working age population should 
continue to grow at least until 2031, although old age support ratios are expected to 
begin falling from around 2020 (Bray 2008). 
Aggregate measures and indicators suggest that the current demographic profile is 
relatively benign when compared to many other European countries (Sobotka 2004). 
The demographic situation is somewhat unexpected given the social and political 
environment. England and Wales have experienced many of the same social changes 
that work to delay and, perhaps, inhibit fertility in other industrialised countries. Time 
spent in education has increased, age at first partnership has increased, and cohabiting 
first partnerships have become increasingly common (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000a). 
Although fertility within cohabiting unions has increased, fertility rates within marital 
unions remain at higher levels (Ekert-Jaffe, Joshi, Lynch, Mougin and Rendall 2002; 
Kiernan 2004). Moreover, getting married and starting a family are no longer so closely 
                                                          
3 Projections for England and Wales have been reported separately, and for small areas such as Wales 
projections are only reported up to 2056. 
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timed. Together these trends have worked to increase the mean age at first birth from 
around 24 in the 1960s, to 27.6 in 2005 (see Figure 6 below).4 
Although it is aware of the problems associated with low fertility and population 
ageing, the Government of the United Kingdom remains reluctant to intervene directly 
to influence fertility outcomes, except to reduce rates of teenage motherhood (Gauthier 
1996; Department for Education and Skills 2006). The current UK policy on 
population, presented to the UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo 
in 1994, reads:  
 
The United Kingdom government does not pursue a population policy in the sense 
of actively trying to influence the overall size of the population, its age-structure, or the 
components of change except in the field of immigration. Nor has it expressed a view 
about the size of population, or the age-structure, that would be desirable for the United 
Kingdom. Its primary concern is for the wellbeing of the population, although it 
continually monitors demographic trends and developments. The current level of births 
has not been the cause of general anxiety. The prevailing view is that decisions about 
fertility and childbearing are for people themselves to make (Office for National 
Statistics 1993). 
 
Not surprisingly, there is little that could be called pro-natalist in the UK policy 
frameworks. Compared to other Western European countries, child benefits are low, 
and the Government remains reluctant to intervene in the labour market (de Henau, 
Meulders, O’Dorchai, and Périvier 2002; Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2006). Equal 
opportunities legislation is strong, but, until recently, there was extremely limited 
support for mothers’ employment in the form of regulation or the provision of childcare 
services (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997). Nonetheless, female labour market 
participation has increased since the 1970s, and employment rates of both women and 
mothers are high (Gregg, Gutierrez and Waldfogel 2003). However, the employment 
experiences of women with and without caring responsibilities differ considerably. For 
those in full-time employment, working hours are long relative to the EU-12 countries 
(Himmelweit and Land 2007). There is no evidence that men reduce their working 
hours when they become fathers – some studies find that fathers work longer hours on 
average (Dermott 2006). The economic environment therefore reinforces a gendered 
division of paid and unpaid work because men’s time is taken up with long hours of 
work, and caring responsibilities are shifted onto the female partner. The high-intensity 
work culture increases the costs of parenthood, and creates disincentives for 
childbearing in dual-earner families, except perhaps amongst the most highly paid 
                                                          
4
 Here and elsewhere, birth order refers to estimates of true birth order. 
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women, who can afford to purchase substitute care (Joshi and Davies 1992; Sigle-
Rushton and Waldfogel 2007). 
Despite the lack of government intervention, fertility rates in England and Wales 
have remained stable and high relative to much of Europe (Coleman 2006). There is, 
however, a good deal of diversity in timing and/or the quantum of fertility across 
different demographic and social groups. Despite a general trend of postponement, 
early first childbearing has persisted resulting in a ‘hump’ in the fertility schedule at 
young ages (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns 2002; Rendall et al. 2005). Consistently 
high rates of teenage pregnancy distinguish England and Wales from its Western 
European counterparts, and are associated with poor outcomes for both the mothers and 
their children (Bynner and Parsons 1999; Social Exclusion Unit 1999; Hobcraft and 
Kiernan 2001). Although researchers disagree on the extent to which early motherhood 
is the outcome of, rather than the precursor to, disadvantage (see, for example, Duncan 
2007), there is some evidence of a causal effect on some outcomes, even after 
attempting to control for selection effects (Ermisch and Pevalin 2003).5 Whether the 
associations are causal or not, young motherhood can be viewed as an indicator of 
disadvantage for both the mother and her children. In addition, amongst the less-
educated and those with a weak attachment to the labour market, childbearing still often 
occurs at young ages, and completed family sizes are larger (Rendall and Tomassini 
2004). Conversely, those who obtain high levels of education tend to delay their first 
birth. Conditional on a first birth, they are more likely to have (and move more quickly 
to) a second birth, but as Berrington (2004) points out, the effect of postponement to 
first birth is not offset by subsequent acceleration. The completed fertility of highly 
educated women, particularly those in managerial positions, remains low relative to 
other women, a pattern not observed in France (Ekert-Jaffe et al. 2002). Finally, the 
proportion of births to mothers born outside the United Kingdom has increased steadily 
in recent years. These figures suggest that the costs of reproduction in England and 
Wales may be falling disproportionately on specific population groups, as reflected in 
its greater variation in completed family size and high concentration ratios (Coleman 
1996; Shkolnikov, Andreev, Houle and Vaupel 2007). A closer examination of fertility 
patterns in England and Wales might raise questions about whether the current 
demographic regime is both stable and fair. 
 
                                                          
5 Although work that tries to isolate the casual effect of becoming a mother before the age of 20 finds little 
evidence that early motherhood has negative effects on the woman’s qualifications, employment or earnings 
at age 30, it does appear to decrease the likelihood of homeownership, and increase the likelihood that her 
partner, if she has one, is unemployed (Ermisch and Pevalin 2003). 
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2. Fertility levels and trends  
2.1 Trends in period fertility and completed family size  
Although fertility began to decline in England and Wales from about 1875, fertility 
change during transition, and in the post-transition years, was neither smooth nor 
homogeneous. Fertility decline began earlier and fell more steeply amongst women of 
higher social and occupational classes (Haines 1989). Fertility continued to fall during 
the first decades of the twentieth century. By the 1930s, fertility had dropped to 
historically low levels, and the TFR remained below two until 1942. Assumptions that 
the sharp downward trends in fertility would continue unabated led to implausible 
projections, whereby, under the most optimistic assumptions, the population of England 
and Wales was projected to be around 28.5 million in 2000 (Hobcraft 1996). In the 
1940s, however, fertility began to climb again, and despite the disruption of the second 
World War and the subsequent period of austerity, the TFR peaked in 1947 at 2.68 
births per woman. It subsequently fell to about 2.2 and remained at that level until 1955 
(Figure 1). An even more dramatic upturn in fertility followed when, in the late 1950s 
and 1960s, the TFR began to grow, and, in 1964, reached its highest level in the 
twentieth century – this time inspiring population projections of 65 million by the year 
2000 (Hobcraft 1996). In fact, the mid-year population in 2000 was just under 53 
million (Ghee 2001). The 1960s baby boom was followed by an almost equally 
dramatic baby bust in the 1970s. Since then, the TFR rebounded slightly and has been 
relatively stable since the early 1980s (Figure 1).   
Measures of completed cohort fertility are available for women born from 1920 
onward, and are depicted in Figure 1. Completed family size follows a downward U-
shaped pattern which, except for the earliest cohorts, tends to track period trends fairly 
closely. For women born in 1920, completed family size was around two children per 
woman. Fertility levels increased in each of the subsequent cohorts up until those born 
between 1934 and 1938. These women were at peak childbearing ages during the 1960s 
baby boom and had around 2.4 children on average. Completed family size 
subsequently declined, levelling off for cohorts born between 1954 and 1960 at levels 
similar to those of the 1920 birth cohort. Women born after 1960 appear to have 
experienced some further decline. Those born in 1964 and 1965 have had about 1.9 
children on average.  
Fluctuations in completed fertility are far less extreme than changes in period 
fertility, particularly during the 1960s baby boom years. The size of the fluctuations in 
the TFR relative to those that have been observed for completed cohort fertility can be 
explained, in part, by changes in the composition of the population at risk (both by age 
and parity) (Ní Bhrolcháin 1987) and by shifts in the timing of births (Bongaarts and 
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Feeney 1998). Counts of the female population by parity, first released in the 1960s, 
can be used to construct an alternative measure of the TFR, one that takes into account 
the structure of the population at risk by age and parity (Smallwood 2002b).6 When the 
total fertility rate is calculated using parity progression ratios (TPPFR7) rather than age 
specific fertility rates, total period fertility is generally similar but fluctuations are 
noticeably less extreme during the 1960s baby boom years (Figure 1; see also Murphy 
and Berrington 1993).  
 
Figure 1: Period and cohort fertility indicators, England and Wales  
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Source: Smallwood (2002a); Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 Nos.13, 27–34, Tables 1.4 1.7, 10.2. 
Note: TPPFR is the total period parity fertility rate, an alternative measure of TFR calculated using period parity progression ratios. 
See Smallwood (2002a). 
                                                          
6
 Vital statistics only contain information on birth order for children who are born to married mothers, and 
even this information is complicated by the way in which information about multiple births is recorded. 
Estimates of the number of all births by ‘true’ birth order are produced by combining vital registration 
information with data collected by the General Household Survey (Smallwood 2002a; Office of Population, 
Censuses and Surveys 1985). 
7
 The TPPFR is calculated using information on the female population broken down by age and parity. For 
detailed information on how it was calculated, see Smallwood (2002a), Box 3. This method is somewhat 
different from that used by Murphy and Berrington (1993) which used information on birth intervals (duration 
of exposure).  
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The decline in fertility after the 1960s baby boom is due in part to a steady decline 
in fertility rates, particularly at parities two and higher (Figure 2). The probability of 
progressing to higher order births fell by around 30 percentage points. In contrast, the 
probability of having a first or second birth fell far less dramatically. Amongst childless 
women, the probability of having a first birth fell steadily from just over 90 percent in 
the 1960s, to about 80 percent in 1982. Similarly, for women of parity one, the 
probability of a second birth fell by only 8.7 points between 1964 and 1982 (Smallwood 
2002a). The 1980s brought a break with past trends. Consistent with the postponement 
of first births, the first birth probability has continued to fall, but progression from other 
parities noticeably levelled off (Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2: Period parity progression ratios for England and Wales, 1964–2000  
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Source: Smallwood (2002a). 
 
 
An examination of the parity distribution of different birth cohorts (Figure 3) 
indicates that, for cohorts born in the two decades before the 1940s, the proportion of 
women having two or more children rose (see also Frejka and Sardon 2006). The 
decline in completed family size for cohorts born since 1938 (Figure 1) appears to have 
been due to two different trends. For the 1940-1950 cohorts, a decline in large families 
(following an earlier increase) was accompanied by a further increase in two-child 
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families. For more recent cohorts, rates of childlessness increased and the proportion 
having two children began to decrease. Proportions at all other parities remained 
relatively stable. About 13 percent of women born in 1950 were childless at age 45, up 
from around 11 percent of the 1940 birth cohort). For women born 10 years later, this 
increased to 18 percent (Figure 3). Although the shift towards a two-child family 
observed in earlier cohorts was not entirely reversed, about half of the earlier gains 
were negated (Office for National Statistics 2006). The predominance of the two-child 
family and the decline of larger families are similar to trends in other European 
countries, but it is noteworthy that the distribution of completed fertility amongst 
women who have recently completely their fertility is more dispersed than in most other 
countries with relatively high rates of both childlessness and of large families. Only 
Ireland follows such a distinctively flat parity distribution (Shkolnikov et al. 2007, 
Table 5). 
 
Figure 3: Percentage distribution of women according to final  
 number of children by birth cohorts 1920-1960 
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Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.5. 
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2.2 The postponement of childbearing  
Since the mid-1960s, at the height of the baby boom, the timing of fertility has changed 
considerably. Slightly less than two-thirds of women aged 15–29 were childless in 
1970. By 2000, 75 percent of women aged 15–29 were childless (Smallwood 2002a). 
Reflecting this trend of postponement, the peak of the age specific fertility schedule has 
been moving to the right. Since the mid-1970s, fertility rates for women aged 30 and 
over have been increasing, and, in 2005, age-specific fertility rates between the ages of 
30 and 40 were similar to 1965 levels (Figure 4). Recently released data for 2006 
suggest this movement to older ages has not abated. The highest birth rate of 99.4 live 
births per 1,000 women was recorded for the 30–34 age group. Although the fertility 
rate of women aged 40+ remains low at 11.4 births per 1,000 women, it is more than 
double what it was in 1986 (Office for National Statistics 2007a). 
  
Figure 4: Age-specific fertility rates in England and Wales, 1965-2005  
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Source: Smallwood (2002a); Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.1. 
 
 
An obvious consequence of these trends is that the mean age at childbearing has 
been increasing since 1974 for all births, offset to some extent by teenage fertility rates 
(Figure 5). Although age at first birth started moving upward slightly earlier (in 1971), 
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the age at birth at all parities has increased since 1974, but more slowly and less 
dramatically for non-marital births and births of parity four or higher (Smallwood 
2002a; Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys 1985).  
 
 
Figure 5: Trends in the mean age of motherhood in England and Wales, 
 1938–2005  
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Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983, Historical series FM1 No. 13, and Vol. Nos. 27, 28, 29 and 33, 
Tables 1.5 and 1.7a; Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys (1985). 
 
 
Although trends in age-specific fertility rates suggest both postponement and 
subsequent recuperation, the shape of the fertility schedule has changed in other, more 
distinct, ways. In the years following the mid-1960s, peaks in age-specific fertility rates 
have fallen considerably, flattening in the early twenties and, to a lesser extent, at 
younger ages, reflecting a far smaller decrease in rates of childbearing amongst 
teenagers in England and Wales compared to other European countries. This flattening 
means that peak rates tend to be lower and the fertility profile more dispersed than in 
other European countries (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns 2002). These patterns can be 
observed in cohort profiles as well.  For women born in the mid- to late-1950s, the age 
profile of first births is more dispersed than in France and Norway, countries with 
similar levels of TFR. As a consequence, a substantially higher proportion of women 
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gave birth at the youngest ages, and a higher proportion delayed childbearing until after 
they turn 30 (Rendall et al. 2005).  
The effect of these changes becomes more apparent when the age-specific fertility 
rates for single years of age are added together to produce fertility rates for five-year 
age groups (Figure 6). The stability of the total fertility rate since the 1980s is due to a 
decrease in fertility at ages 20 to 29, which is offset by an increase at ages 30 to 40. 
Fertility at the oldest and youngest ages has remained fairly stable. Since 2000, fertility 
for those aged 20 to 29 has levelled off. In contrast, for women in their thirties, it has 
continued to rise. These trends contributed to the recent rise in the TFR between 2001 
and 2006 (Office for National Statistics 2007a). 
 
 
Figure 6: Age-specific fertility rates (per 100 women) for five-year age groups,  
 1965–2005  
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Source: Smallwood (2002a); Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.1 
Note: Each point in the graph above represents data from a single calendar year. Age-specific fertility rates are summed together for 
each five year age group. 
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Patterns of postponement and recuperation can be observed at a cohort level as 
well. Figure 7 plots the cumulative fertility, every five years from age 15, of successive 
cohorts of women, relative to those born in 1950 who had 2.07 children on average. 
Teenage fertility declined for the next three cohorts, with a cumulative fertility at age 
20 of 0.05 (1955 cohort), 0.12 (1960 cohort), and 0.16 (1965 cohort) fewer children. 
This figure then stabilised for each of the subsequent cohorts at around 0.14 to 0.16 
fewer children.  
The gap in fertility widened until age 25 for the cohorts born in 1955 and 1965, 
and until age 30 for each successive cohort with data at that age. Although women born 
after 1950 never reached the same level of fertility, more than half the gap at age 30 
was closed by either age 40 (1955 and 1965 cohort) or age 45 (1960 cohort). Compared 
to women born in 1950, completed fertility for the 1955 and 1960 birth cohorts was 
0.05 to 0.09 fewer births per woman, respectively. Data at age 40 for the 1965 cohort 
suggest further decline is likely unless fertility increases very steeply over the next five 
years. However, the convergence of the curves for the 1975, 1980 and 1985 cohorts 
suggests that patterns of postponement may be stabilising.  
 
Figure 7: Cumulative fertility by age for birth cohorts,  
 compared with women born in 1950  
 
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
15 20 25 30 35 40 45
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
 
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.2. 
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2.3 Differential fertility patterns  
Compared to other European countries, fertility rates in England and Wales have 
remained stable in a context where government support for families, particularly 
working families, has been improving but remains fairly limited. To some extent, the 
low fertility that might be expected in this context has materialised, but as we see in this 
section, only for some groups.  
 
 
2.3.1 Teenage childbearing  
From the 1970s, teenage fertility rates fell only slightly, while the rest of the fertility 
schedule was shifting more emphatically down and to the right as fertility was being 
postponed. This trend is reflected in the continuously high and overlapping curves at 
early ages for the 1985, 1995 and 2005 age-specific fertility rates, characteristic of most 
English-speaking countries, which have emerged over the past three decades (Chandola 
et al. 2002; Figure 4). Although there is evidence for the intergenerational transmission 
of early motherhood in England and Wales (Huerta and Sigle-Rushton 2008), rates of 
teenage childbearing amongst women who were born to older mothers are high as well, 
and explain most of the cross-country differences (Rendall 2003).  
The Government’s Social Exclusion Unit (1999) considers high teenage pregnancy 
rates to be due to low aspirations (stemming for high levels of inequality), ignorance 
about the risks of unprotected sex, and mixed messages about the appropriateness of 
sexual behaviour. Although the official understanding of the issues surrounding early 
motherhood, particularly the ignorance of young women, has not gone unquestioned 
(see for example van Loon 2003; Duncan 2007), data drawn from the Millennium 
Cohort Study suggest that a large majority of young mothers—86.9 percent of those 
who gave birth before the age of 18, and 75.9 percent of those who gave birth between 
the ages of 19 and 21—describe their pregnancy as unplanned (Joshi, Hawkes and 
Ward 2004, Table 5). This suggests that there is some scope for interventions aimed at 
giving women more control over the timing of their first conception. 
In 1999, the Teenage Pregnancy Strategy was implemented. The Strategy set 
targets for reducing the under-18 conception rate by 2004 (by 15 percent) and 2010 (by 
half), relative to their 1998 levels (Social Exclusion Unit 1999; Department for 
Education and Skills 2006). Since the targets were set, under-18 conception rates in 
England have fallen year on year and, because of increases in abortion (see Section 2.4 
below), under-18 birth rates have fallen even more (Teenage Pregnancy Unit 2008). 
Data for Wales, where teenage conception rates tend to be higher, suggest that under-18 
conceptions fell quickly between 1998 and 2001, and continued to decline thereafter, 
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but far more slowly (Statistics for Wales, 2005). Despite some success, the 2004 target 
was not met, and if current trends continue, it is unlikely that the 2010 target will be 
met (Wilkinson et al. 2006; see also Teenage Pregnancy Unit 2008).  
Although it is likely that an initiative which successfully reduced teenage 
parenthood would simply result in the postponement of early births to later ages, and 
that the overall impact on completed family size would be small, it is nonetheless worth 
noting that teenage childbearing makes a notable contribution to period fertility rates 
(Figure 6). In 2005, the TFR of 1.80 would have fallen to 1.73 if contributions from 
those under twenty were halved. All else equal, a substantial reduction in teenage 
childbearing would have worked to reduce the TFR in the first years of the twenty-first 
century. 
 
 
2.3.2 Educational differentials  
Although only a few studies have examined differences in fertility by women’s 
educational qualifications in England and Wales, evidence suggests considerable and 
widening differentials in the timing of fertility by education level. These differentials 
reflect both the composition of different educational groups (minority ethnic groups and 
those from impoverished or low social class backgrounds tend to have lower levels of 
education) and the link between education and labour market position (Hobcraft 2000; 
Hobcraft and Kiernan 2001; Robson and Berthoud 2003). The age profile of first birth 
rates has shifted and flattened for both medium- and high-educated women, both over 
time and relative to patterns observed in Norway and France. Comparing women born 
between 1954 and 1958 with those born between 1963 and 1967, Rendall and 
colleagues (2005) find that, amongst those born in the 1950s, 46.2 percent of medium-
educated and 49.1 percent high-educated women had a child between the ages of 21 and 
29.8 For those born in the 1960s, the percentage of women giving birth in their twenties 
had fallen to 41.7 for the medium-educated, and to 37.3 for the high-educated. 
Additionally, high-educated women in the younger cohort were far less likely to have 
given birth by age 33 – a fall of more than 10 percentage points (Table 1). In Norway 
and France, percentages of high-educated women giving birth by age 33 were well over 
70 percent. In contrast to the profiles of the medium- and high-educated, amongst low-
educated women the age profile of fertility changed little across cohorts. Around 42 
percent of low- educated women gave birth before the age of 21 in both cohorts, and 
                                                          
8
 Age in this study is measured as age completed during the calendar year. All other data in this chapter are 
based on age completed last birthday. 
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more than 80 percent gave birth before the age of 33 (Table 1). These patterns suggest 
that trends in postponement differ substantially by education level.  
 
Table 1: Percentage of women with a child by select ages, by cohort and  
 education level*, 1950s and 1960s cohorts 
 
 Age Low education Medium education High education
 1950s 1960s 1950s 1960s 1950s 1960s
19 23.8 23.6 10.0 8.0 0.4 0.0
21 41.8 42.6 20.3 17.0 1.8 0.2
25 66.0 67.0 45.9 38.2 16.9 9.9
29 80.3 78.0 66.5 58.7 50.9 37.5
33 84.1 82.3 76.9 72.1 65.3 53.8
 
Source: Rendall et al. (2005).  
Note: * Women’s education level was reported at about age 25. 
 
Research comparing longitudinal data for Great Britain with similar data from 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden tells a similar story about differentials in the 
timing of birth by level of education. In the 1990s, the mean age at first birth amongst 
British mothers who were high-educated was five years older than that of mothers with 
low education – the widest gap observed across all four countries. Fertility patterns in 
the 1950s and 1960s showed far less differentiation by educational attainment, and most 
of the subsequent divergence was due to high-educated women postponing their first 
birth (Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels 2002). Although there are clear patterns of 
postponement, this study does not consider the implications of postponement for 
childlessness or completed family size. So it is not clear to what extent high-educated 
women recuperate postponed fertility. 
The prevailing view amongst policymakers that work and childbearing decisions 
should be largely determined privately appears to have created a situation where higher 
level work and motherhood have been increasingly difficult to combine, at least at 
young ages (Office for National Statistics 1993; Dixon and Margo 2006). There is, 
however, some evidence that postponed fertility is recuperated. Amongst those born in 
the 1950s, higher qualified mothers had a median age at first birth that was about five 
years older than that of women with less education, but, conditional on having had a 
first birth, they were more likely to go on to have a second or third birth and to do so 
more quickly (Rendall and Smallwood 2003; Table 2). Nonetheless, more than 22.5 
percent of high-educated women had remained childless by age 40, compared to 15.2 
percent of women with lower qualifications. Ekert-Jaffe and colleagues (2002) report 
similar findings. Berrington (2004) examined a sample of women who were in their 
early forties when they were interviewed for the 2000 and 2001 General Household 
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Survey (which covers all of Great Britain), and found that 28 percent of women with 
the highest educational qualifications were childless. For those with a medium level of 
education (“intermediate qualifications”), rates of childlessness were only 20 percent. 
Finally amongst those with no qualifications, only 16 percent were childless in their 
early forties. One-child families were more common amongst women with high 
qualifications, so about half of the high-educated had a completed family size of one or 
less. Conversely, very few women with no qualifications had only one child, and about 
one in five had a completed family size of four of more children. These studies 
demonstrate differentials in not just the timing of fertility, but the quantum of fertility 
by level of education.  
 
Table 2: Proportions of mothers having a second birth and timing  
 of second births, by age at first birth and education level,  
 1954–58 cohort in England and Wales  
 
  age 25 age 30 age35 
Percentage having a  
a second birth  
no higher qualifications 93.0 83.5 59.8 
higher qualifications 96.0 90.8 73.6 
Timing of second births   
Within 2 years  
no higher qualifications 53.4 48.9 45.6 
higher qualifications 60.6 56.7 51.7 
Within 5 years  
no higher qualifications 92.7 91.9 93.6 
higher qualifications 95.2 94.7 95.2 
 
Source: Rendall and Smallwood (2003). 
 
While various studies have documented changes in the timing of first births, and 
some studies have documented educational differentials in childlessness and completed 
family size for specific cohorts, few have examined change over time in the relationship 
between education and fertility. There is little evidence concerning trends in the 
numbers remaining childless, or on completed family size by education level. It may 
well be that high-educated women are postponing their first birth, but accelerating 
subsequent births, and that, consequently, their completed fertility is little changed 
relative to historic levels. If that is the case, we cannot conclude that reproduction is 
being shifted towards other population groups in the long run, making concerns about 
changes in the distribution of the costs of childbearing less worrying. Even if 
differentials are not changing, they clearly exist, and issues of fairness may remain 
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salient, especially in a context where support for families is low relative to much of the 
EU-15. On the other hand, it is possible that fertility that has been increasingly 
postponed has also been, and will continue to be, increasingly foregone. If this is the 
case, educational differentials in fertility may have contributed to the upward trend in 
child poverty rates in the 1980s and 1990s (for a discussion in the US context, see 
Lichter 1997).  
 
 
2.3.3 Fertility of immigrants and ethnic minority groups  
Information on immigration to England and Wales is limited. The main source of 
information on the number of international migrants is the International Passenger 
Survey (IPS) which collects information on place of birth, citizenship and place of 
origin for a sample of individuals passing through UK ports. In addition, counts of 
foreign immigrants, broken down by citizenship only, is available from the Home 
Office Control of Immigration Statistics. However, information on place of birth is 
available in vital statistics (asked as a voluntary question at the registration of births and 
deaths since 1969) and census data. Data from the 2001 census indicate that just under 
nine percent of the population of England and Wales were born outside of the United 
Kingdom. Finally, the Labour Force Survey contains information on birthplace, 
citizenship, and date of entry, but for an analysis of small groups the numbers are often 
insufficient, and samples from several years must be combined in order to obtain 
statistically significant results (Coleman and Smith 2005).  
Registration data from 1971 suggests that 11.3 percent of all births were to women 
born outside the United Kingdom. Thirty-five years later, 21.9 per cent of births were to 
women born outside of the United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics 2007b). In 
the 1980s, more than eight percent of all births were to women who were born in the 
New Commonwealth or Pakistan. By 2003, this figure had increased to nearly 19 
percent of all births (Coleman and Smith 2005). In particular, women born in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, many of whom are young mothers and poorly educated as well, have 
had consistently high levels of fertility (Robson and Berthoud 2003).   
Table 3 sets out estimates of the total fertility rate by country of birth for several 
years. The denominators are constructed using the estimated population by place of 
birth using information from the last census, combined with birth and death 
registrations and international migration estimates. With limited information on 
international migration, it is likely the measure is subject to greater levels of error the 
farther away it is from the last census date (Coleman and Smith 2005). For Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi women, TFRs were above six in the early 1980s, and, despite having 
fallen somewhat during the 1990s, are still well above European levels. In 2001, the 
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TFR for these women was more than twice the national average. In contrast, the fertility 
of women born in India and the rest of the world is far closer to the national average.  
 
Table 3: Total fertility rate: by country of birth of mother,  
 England and Wales 1981 – 2001 
 
Country of birth of mother 1981 1987 1991 1997 2001 
Total 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 
United Kingdom1 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Total outside UK 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2 
New Commonwealth 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.1 2.8 
India 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.3 
Pakistan 4.8 5.3 4.7 
Bangladesh 6.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 3.9 
East Africa 2.1 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 
Rest of Africa2 3.4 3.2 2.7 3.5 2.0 
Rest of New Commonwealth3 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.9 2.2 
Rest of the World 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.8 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 Nos. 22, 24, 26, and 32, Table 9.5 
Note: 1 Including Isle of Man and Channel Islands 
2 Includes countries listed under Southern Africa and Rest of Africa in Table A of birth statistics, series FM1 No.32 
3 Includes countries listed under Far East, Mediterranean, Caribbean and Rest of New Commonwealth in Table A of birth statistics, 
series FM1 No 32. 
 
The contribution of foreign births to the overall TFR is small, but not trivial. 
Estimates suggest that, in England and Wales in 2001, the total fertility rate of 1.63 
would have fallen to 1.56 if the 17 percent of all births to mothers who had been born 
outside of the whole United Kingdom were excluded. In 2006, the TFR for the UK as a 
whole would have fallen by 0.1 births per woman (Office for National Statistics 2007b). 
Because of increased tempo shortly after migrating9 and data issues10, their longer-term 
contribution to fertility is more difficult to determine. In any case, net migration is 
                                                          
9
 As Toulemon (2006) illustrates, the TFR for migrants can overstate the number of births that migrants are 
likely to have because migrants often have particularly high rates of fertility shortly after they have migrated, 
and lower rates before arriving. These effects will be particularly strong in a context where recent migrants 
comprise a large share of all migrants.  
10
 The most recent TFR of 1.87 may be biased upward because of high levels of immigration and poor quality 
immigration data. The migrant population has increased substantially since 2000, but is not well counted. 
Mothers tend to be counted and are included in the numerator of fertility rates.  However, many women who 
have migrated but remain childless are unlikely to be precisely counted. The contribution of immigrants to the 
numerator should be far more precise. Their contribution to the denominator is likely to be underestimated by 
high levels of poorly recorded migration.  
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estimated to have increased by 48 percent between 2003–04 and 2004–05. Although 
TFRs for UK-born women have increased, high levels of migration and a higher share 
of new immigrants as a proportion of the foreign born have contributed to the increase 
in the TFR between 2001 and 2006 (Office for National Statistics 2007b). If current 
migration trends continue, the contribution of immigrants to period fertility indicators 
should increase in importance. 
 
 
3. Fertility related changes in patterns of family formation  
3.1 The decline in marriage and the rise of cohabitation  
For cohorts born in the first half of the twentieth century, marriage occurred early and 
was nearly universal. Amongst those born between 1931 and 1951, more than half of 
men and three-quarters of women were married before the age of 25 (Table 4). By age 
50, 11.1 percent of men born in 1951 had never married. For women the figure was 
even lower. Data for younger cohorts show that marriage was increasingly both 
postponed and foregone (Murphy and Wang 1999; Bynner et al. 2002; Office for 
National Statistics 2006). For those cohorts born in 1965, fewer than 30 percent of men 
and just under half of women were married by age 25. By age 40, over 29 percent of 
men and 21 percent of women had never married – a substantial increase in non-
marriage relative to previous birth cohorts. Turning to the most recent cohorts, young 
marriage has become even more uncommon. In recent years, mean age at first marriage 
has increased to over 29 for women, and to 31 for men (Office for National Statistics 
2006).  
The postponement of marriage is linked to a more prolonged and, in some ways, 
more difficult transition from adolescence to adulthood. Over the second half of the 
twentieth century, fewer men and women were leaving school with no qualifications, 
and numbers enrolled in higher education have grown. This has worked to increase the 
number of years spent in education during late adolescence – a stage in the life course 
when many earlier cohorts were entering marriage. Comparing men and women born in 
1958 and 1970, Bynner and Parsons (2001) find that fewer members of the 1970 cohort 
were unqualified, and more had gone on to obtain higher qualifications. As time spent 
in education was being prolonged, the labour market was changing rapidly. By 1986, 
the youth labour market had deteriorated in many parts of the UK, and those leaving 
school were often unemployed or only able to obtain casual employment. There were 
fewer apprenticeships, although some enrolled in youth training programmes (Bynner et 
al. 2002). Finally, those born in 1970 were entering adulthood at a time when housing 
costs were prohibitively high. To make matters worse, the policy of selling off local 
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authority housing, which had a large effect from the mid-1980s, meant that there was a 
limited stock of public accommodation available. Moreover, the available stock was 
“concentrated in the least salubrious areas and among the most economically and 
socially disadvantaged groups” (Smith and Ferri 2003: 206). Those making the 
transition to adulthood in the late 1980s and at the turn of the century faced similar 
problems with the costs of housing. These conditions, along with less job security and 
increasing rates of youth unemployment (discussed in more detail in Section 5 below), 
made leaving the parental home particularly difficult. Data for the UK as a whole 
indicate that more than 37 percent of men and 18 percent of women aged 20–24 in 1994 
were still living with their parents (Aassve, Billari, Mazzuco and Ongaro 2002).  
 
 
Table 4:  Proportions of men and women ever married at select ages,  
 by birth cohort 1931–1985  
 
 Age in years 
Men 20 25 30 40 50
1931 2.8 52.3 80.9 90.1 91.8
1941 6.3 60.5 83.0 90.8 92.1
1951 9.8 58.5 78.0 87.2 88.9
1961 5.7 38.2 61.5 76.4
1965 3.1 28.9 52.7 70.6
1975 0.9 11.1 31.1
1980 0.7 8.5
1985 0.5
 
Women 20 25 30 40 50
1931 18.7 75.0 88.9 93.6 94.7
1941 28.0 80.4 90.7 94.9 95.7
1951 30.6 77.4 88.1 92.7 93.6
1961 20.2 57.7 74.3 83.5
1965 12.3 47.3 66.5 78.3
1975 3.9 22.1 44.1
1980 2.8 17.3
1985 2.1     
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Marriage Divorce and Adoption Statistics, Series FM2, No. 32 Table 3.36. 
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With changes in the transition to adulthood came changes in the nature of first 
partnership. Specifically, cohabitation replaced direct marriage for a large percentage of 
young adults (Kiernan 1999). Up until the late 1970s, the prevalence of cohabiting 
unions was low and the majority of those cohabiting were divorced and separated. Since 
that time cohabitation has become far more common, and the characteristics of women 
and men who choose to cohabit has changed. Between 1976 and 1998, the proportion of 
unmarried women who were cohabiting in Great Britain increased more than threefold, 
from nine percent to 29 percent, and the percentage of cohabiting women who were 
never married increased sharply (Haskey 2001). For the cohort born between 1950 and 
1962, data drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) show that those 
from high social class backgrounds were more likely to cohabit. For the 1963–76 
cohort, cohabitation was more normative, and the association is not significant 
(Ermisch and Francesconi 2000b). Using the same data source, another analysis reports 
that, for those born between 1963 and 1967, premarital cohabitation as a first 
partnership was most common amongst women with degree level qualifications 
(Kiernan 1999, Table 8). Amongst those who had a first partnership by 1992, only 27 
percent of the most highly educated women married directly, whilst over 40 percent of 
women with lower qualifications reported having done so. Educational differentials 
have subsequently disappeared. Ermisch (2005) suggests these changes are due to a 
diffusion of more tolerant attitudes about consensual unions spreading from the more 
privileged innovators to the wider society. The increasing popularity of unmarried 
cohabiting unions and their changing character mean that the time spent outside of a 
partnership in young adulthood has grown, but far less than figures on the 
postponement of marriage would suggest (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000a). 
About half of all cohabitating unions formed by women born in 1970 were 
subsequently dissolved, and rates of dissolution are higher for those with low levels of 
education (Ermisch 2005). Nonetheless, in analyses that compared cohorts born in 1958 
and 1970, Steele and colleagues (2006) find that having children is associated with 
relatively greater stability in the younger cohort, and the authors suggest that the 
distinction between married and cohabiting partnerships with children may be less 
important now than it was in the past.  
 
 
3.2 A weakening of the link between marriage and childbearing  
In the last three to four decades, the nature of the relationship between marriage and 
first childbearing has changed. In the 1970s, a small (but increasing, especially after 
1977) proportion of births occurred outside of marriage (Figure 8), and first marital 
births tended to occur very shortly after marriage. In more recent years, longer intervals 
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between marriage and first birth have become increasingly common. In 1970, 59 
percent of all marital first births were to women who had been married one year or less, 
and nine percent were to women who had been married for five years or more. By 2005, 
16 percent of first marital births were to women who had been married five years or 
more. Moreover, 48 percent of marital first births took place in the first two years – an 
11 point decline since 1970 (Table 5).   
 
Figure 8: Annual number of marriages and births, England and Wales,  
 1938–2004  
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Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983 (Historical series FM1 No 13); FM1 Volume No's 18 and 28 to 33, 
Tables 1.5 and 2.1.  
 
 
Over the same period, it became less likely that marriage would precede 
childbearing. The percentage of births taking place outside of marriage – many but not 
all of which are first births to never married women – increased from around nine 
percent in 1975, to 43 percent in 2004 (Figure 8). Part of this increase was apparently 
due to a decline in the propensity of women to marry shortly after becoming pregnant. 
That one in four first marital births in 1970 were to women who had been married seven 
months or less suggests that it was not uncommon for a woman’s pregnancy to instigate 
marriage (Table 5). By 2005, only nine percent of first marital births occurred so 
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quickly after marriage. Data on first marriages tell a similar story about changes to the 
relative timing of marriage and childbirth. In the 1960s, around one in five first 
marriages were followed by a birth in the next eight months. By 2003, this had 
decreased to 9.5 percent, although levels and rates of change vary considerably by age 
at marriage (Table 6). 
 
 
Table 5: First marital births by duration of the marriage,  
 all married women 1970–2005  
 
    Percentage of first marital births by duration of marriage 
 Completed months Completed years 
 
All 
durations(N) 0–7 8–11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
1970 277,407 0.25 0.11 0.36 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06
1975 226,944 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.09
1980 240,975 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.13
1985 212,017 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.13
1990 200,394 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.13
1995 168,118 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.13
2000 146,509 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.13
2005 155,953 0.09 0.11  0.20 0.28 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.11
 
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983 (Historical series FM1 No 13); FM1 Volume No's 18 and 28 to 34, 
Table 5.1.  
 
 
The rise of unmarried cohabitation has led to an increasing proportion of births 
taking place within unions, but outside of marriage (Steele, Joshi, Kallis and Goldstein 
2006). Although non-marital births have increased substantially, simulations suggest 
that only about one-fifth of the increase can be attributed to changes in non-marital 
fertility rates. Most of the increase appears to be due to growth in the population at risk 
of a non-marital birth – many of whom are in cohabiting unions – and not to increases 
in the non-marital fertility rates, which remain low compared to marital fertility rates 
(Ermisch 1999). Changes in partnership and fertility behaviour have contributed to a 
rather small increase in the median age of motherhood. Comparing cohorts of women 
born between 1950 and 1952 with women born from 1962–1976, Ermisch and 
Francesconi (2000b) found that the median age of motherhood increased over a year 
from 26.4 to 27.5.  
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Table 6: The percentage of first marriages where a birth occurs  
 within eight months, by age of mother at marriage  
 
  Age at Marriage 
  
Under 45 Under 20 Age 20–24 Age 25–29 Age 30–44 
1955 14.8 24.3 13.4 10.4 8.1 
1960 18.6 33.8 13.6 12.3 9.1 
1965 22.3 38.3 15.6 13.5 10.2 
1970 20.0 35.4 13.6 11.8 9.9 
1975 13.0 23.8 8.1 7.4 7.4 
1980 14.0 25.5 9.8 9.6 10.7 
1985 13.4 26.8 10.9 10.4 11.0 
1990 11.5 24.0 10.4 9.5 11.7 
1995 10.1 20.6 10.3 8.3 10.8 
2000 9.3 19.9 10.9 7.5 8.8 
2003 9.5 20.1 11.2 7.8 9.0 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983 (Historical series FM1 No 13) Table 1.7; FM1 Volume No's 18 and 28 
to 33, Table 1.8.  
 
 
3.3 Divorce and union dissolution  
Secular divorce was first created in 1857. The Matrimonial Causes Act (1937) 
permitted fault-based divorce on the grounds of adultery, cruelty and desertion of at 
least three years. There are no reliable statistics on divorce prior to 1950, but it was not 
until the availability of legal aid in 1950 that divorce became affordable for a significant 
portion of the British population. The Divorce Reform Act of 1969 introduced divorce 
by mutual consent with a separation period of at least two years. This was followed 
shortly after by the Matrimonial Causes Act in 1973, according to which a divorce can 
be granted if the petitioner has been married for at least one year, and the marriage has 
“broken down irretrievably”. Irretrievable breakdown is evidenced when one of the 
following five facts is established as “proof”: adultery of the other spouse, unreasonable 
behaviour of the other spouse, desertion after two years, separation with mutual consent 
after two years, or separation with no consent after five years (Smart 1999). In about 70 
percent of cases in England and Wales, the divorce petitioner cites adultery or 
unreasonable behaviour in the petition for divorce (Office for National Statistics 2007c) 
In 1995, the government mooted the idea of divorce law reform, and published 
Looking to the Future: Mediation and the Ground for Divorce (Lord Chancellor’s 
Department 1995). The Family Law Act of 1996 soon followed. The Act would have 
led to the adoption of no-fault divorce. The Bill was passed but only partly 
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implemented. Since then, divorce reform in England and Wales has been in a state of 
limbo. The law continues to be fault based and, for the most part, based on the 
Matrimonial Causes Act (Smart 1999). 
Although there had been short-lived increases in previous decades, the divorce rate 
did not begin its consistent and steep upward trend until the early 1960s (Smith 1997). 
The total divorce rate11 increased from 0.1 to 0.4 between 1960 and 1980. It 
subsequently stabilised after 1995, at around 0.45. While not the highest in Europe, this 
rate places England and Wales on the high end of EU countries (Eurostat 2004; Council 
of Europe 2005).  
The net effect of divorce on fertility is difficult to predict. High divorce rates 
combined with the high rates of dissolution amongst cohabitating couples should work 
to dampen fertility, but fertility intentions may be revised upward with repartnering to 
take into account the preferences of the new partner, or because of the desire of newly 
formed couples to have at least one shared child (Vikat, Thomson and Hoem 1999). 
This may have countervailing effects. Data from the early 1990s suggest that 45 percent 
of British women who experienced a divorce gave birth within twelve years of having 
dissolved their marriages. Interestingly, the woman’s parity at the time of dissolution 
was not strongly associated with subsequent childbearing. This finding suggests that the 
decision-making process of previously divorced women differs from that of women 
who are still in their first marriage, where parity is likely to be a key consideration 
(Jefferies, Berrington and Diamond 2000). 
 
 
3.4 Changes in sexual behaviour, contraceptive use and induced abortion  
The 1960s and 1970s saw unprecedented change in both sexual behaviour and the 
control of reproduction. Delayed marriage was not met with similar delays in sexual 
debut. Data from the Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles Survey indicate that nearly one in 
five British women born between 1926 and 1930 had experienced their first sexual 
intercourse by the age of 20. For this birth cohort, the median age at first intercourse 
was 23 – about the median age at first marriage. For the cohort born in the second half 
of the 1950s, the median age had fallen to 19, an age at which fewer than 20 percent 
were married (Botting and Dunnell 2000). Those born in between these two cohorts 
engaged in more pre-marital sexual activity at young ages than those born earlier, but 
did not benefit from good access to contraception. The result was a large number of 
‘shotgun marriages’ in the post-war period, as evidenced by the peak in premarital 
                                                          
11
 The total divorce rate is a period measure calculated by summing divorce rates by duration of marriage for 
a given year. 
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conceptions in the 1960s, especially for those under 20, which fell subsequently to 
1950s levels by the second half of the 1970s (Hobcraft 1996). These patterns also 
suggest that contraception and abortion were widely used once they became legally 
available. 
Women reaching adulthood in the 1970s had unprecedented access to reliable 
contraceptive methods and legal abortion. The contraceptive pill was made available for 
purchase in January of 1961. At first, contraceptive services were only available to 
married women and for medical reasons, and their extension to women who were 
unmarried took place over many years. However, by 1974, the contraceptive pill was 
provided by the National Health Service to all women free of charge (Hobcraft 1996).   
Women first gained legal access to abortion in 1968 (legalised by a new Act of 
Parliament in 1967). For the first five years, services were limited and rates of use were 
low (Table 7). As services became more widespread between 1969 and 1974, rates of 
use more than doubled. Currently, a woman can obtain an abortion in the first 24 weeks 
of pregnancy (lowered in 1990 from 28 weeks in the original Act), as long as two 
doctors conclude that a woman’s physical or mental health or her child(ren)’s physical 
or mental health will be under greater threat if she continues with the pregnancy than if 
she terminates it. In cases where two doctors decide a woman’s health is gravely 
threatened if she carries the pregnancy to term, or that the foetus is likely to suffer from 
severe physical or mental abnormalities, there is no legal time limit. In practice, most 
abortions take place well within the time limit. In 2006, 89 percent of abortions were 
carried out within 13 weeks of conception (Department of Health 2007). 
 
Table 7: Frequency of induced abortion in England and Wales, 1969-2005 
 
Year 
Number of 
Abortions
Abortions per
100 conceptions*
All Ages Crude 
Abortion Rate(15–44)
Standardised
Abortion Rate
1969 54,819 5.9 5.3 5.2
1974 162,940 14.6 11.5 11.2
1979 149,746 15.9 12.0 11.5
1984 169,993 17.6 12.8 12.2
1989 183,974 19.9 15.5 15.1
1994 166,876 19.1 14.6 14.6
1999 183,250 21.8 16.2 16.8
2004 194,498 22.5 16.9 17.8
2005 194,353 n.a. 17.0 17.8
2006 201,173 n.a. 17.5 18.3
 
*Not ending in miscarriage 
Source: Department of Health (2007). 
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/ab-ukenglandwales.html. 
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In 1995, the proportion of conceptions leading to an abortion was, at 19, well 
above the level observed in many other Western European countries, and similar to 
those found in Scandinavian countries. At the same time, it was lower than in other 
English speaking countries where it was legal (Henshaw, Singh and Haas 1999). 
However, in 1996, the rate of conceptions and the rate of abortion both increased, 
particularly amongst women aged 20–24. Researchers have linked the sudden increase 
to a warning issued by the Committee on Safety of Medicines in October 1995 about a 
link between seven brands of contraceptive pill and thrombosis (Wood, Botting and 
Dunnell 1997). Despite increasing use of emergency contraception (Botting and 
Dunnell 2003), abortion rates have continued to increase and, in 2004, 22.5 percent of 
conceptions leading to either an abortion or a live birth ended in legal abortion. This 
trend has not been well examined or well explained in the extant research. Although 
some have suggested that subsequent pill scares are to blame (Summerfield and Babb 
2003), there is little evidence that use of contraceptive pills has declined appreciably, 
even at the time of the 1995 scare (Wood et al. 1997; Taylor, Keyse and Bryant 2006). 
With the exception of legal abortion, there is little good information on the use of 
contraceptive services prior to the Family Formation Survey (FFS) of 1976. At that 
time, the contraceptive pill was the most commonly used method, and about 28 percent 
of women aged 14–49 were using it (Botting and Dunnell 2000). In 2005, about 24 
percent of women used the contraceptive pill, representing just under one-third of 
women using any method (Table 8).   
During the 1970s and 1980s, surgical sterilisation became common in England and 
Wales, and has remained at high levels since that time (Botting and Dunnell 2000). In 
line with historic trends, similar proportions of male and female sterilisations were 
reported in 2005, when nearly 40 percent of women aged 40 and over reported that 
either they or their partners had been sterilised as a means of contraception. The use of 
sterilisation for women in their thirties has declined somewhat over time (Taylor et al. 
2006). This is most probably due to trends in the postponement of fertility.  
Except for condoms, the use of which has increased over time (often used in 
addition to other methods), the proportions using other types of methods have remained 
fairly low and stable since the 1970s. Condom use began climbing in the early 1990s, 
most probably due to concerns about HIV-AIDS. Data collected in 1997 suggest that 
disease prevention was a motivating factor for 54 percent of men and 62 percent of 
women who reported having used a condom in the previous 12 months (Botting and 
Dunnell 2000).   
High and stable rates of fertility in England and Wales are not due to low levels of 
contraceptive use, except perhaps for specific groups of younger people (Social 
Exclusion Unit 1999). Modern methods of contraception – the contraceptive pill in 
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particular – have, at least since the mid-1970s, been used at high levels in young 
adulthood, after which sterilization becomes increasingly common. 
 
 
Table 8: Contraceptive methods used in 2005/06,  
 percentages by age group  
 
Age 16–17 18–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 All
Percentage using any modern method 51 67 82 74 78 78 70 75 74
Current method(s) used (those using at least one method)        
Non-surgical methods          
Pill 61 60 63 47 43 23 15 6 32
Male condom 78 50 43 34 32 26 16 14 28
IUD 0 2 0 6 6 8 9 12 7
Injection/implant 12 21 13 9 6 4 2 1 6
Periodic abstinence 0 0 0 3 3 2 2 0 2
Withdrawal 6 0 4 7 5 4 6 4 5
Other non-surgical 16 6 3 3 8 4 3 7 6
Surgical methods    
Sterilized 0 0 1 2 9 18 17 29 13
Partner Sterilized 0 0 1 4 5 15 34 29 15
Percentage not using any method 49 33 18 26 22 22 30 25 26
Reason for not using a method (those not using any method)       
No heterosexual relations 96 100 87 65 40 45 42 42 55
Sterile after another operation 0 0 0 5 1 11 23 15 10
Wants to get pregnant 0 0 0 17 30 21 7 4 12
Currently pregnant 4 0 8 6 16 4 1 0 5
Possibly infertile (post-menopausal or other) 0 0 4 4 6 7 15 35 12
Doesn't like contraception 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 0 2
Other reason 0 0 2 3 3 9 8 5 5
N 55 39 154 161 214 270 261 224 1377
 
Source: Taylor, Keyse and Bryant (2006).  
 
 
4. Social and population policies  
Although there has been little policy that aims directly to influence fertility, it is likely 
that changes to social and economic policies in recent years have had indirect effects by 
altering the costs of childbearing. Prior to 1997, family policy was minimal, reflecting 
the liberal, individualistic and market oriented ideology of the United Kingdom. Taxes 
tended to be individualized (although there was some tax relief in the past for married 
couples), and, for married couples, issues of fertility and child care were considered 
private matters (O’Donoghue and Sutherland 1999; Randall 1999). In contrast, the 
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United Kingdom was unique (along with the Netherlands) in that it expected lone 
mothers to remain at home and care for their children full-time, and provided low levels 
of income support that enabled them to do so (Millar 1996). But changes in recent years 
have reflected a marked move towards greater governmental support of families with 
children, especially when those families are engaged in (low) paid work. Some of the 
more important aspects of recent policy reforms and developments include 
improvements to maternity and parental leave entitlements, including a right for parents 
with small children to request part-time hours (Lewis and Campbell 2007); increases in 
child benefit12 (counterbalanced for some families by the removal of the lone parent 
supplement); changes to the tax system that increase incentives for people to take up 
paid work (Brewer and Shephard 2004); and improved public provision of child care 
(Brewer, Crawford and Dearden 2005). Although these changes took place fairly 
recently, we can nonetheless speculate about the likely impact. 
 
 
4.1 The employment rights of parents  
Statutory maternity leave has existed since the 1970s, but it was originally only 
available to women who had been continuously employed with the same employer for 
at least two years (five years for women working short part-time hours). A substantial 
proportion of working women failed to meet this requirement (McRae 1991). 
Entitlement was only extended to all working mothers in the early 1990s, at which time 
a two-tiered system of Ordinary Maternity Leave (OML) and Additional Maternity 
Leave (AML) was put in place (Gregg et al. 2003). Until recently, all women 
employees were entitled to 26 weeks of OML, and those who had completed 26 weeks 
continuous employment with their present employer were eligible for a further 26 
weeks of AML. For babies due on or after 1 April 2007, job protected maternity leave 
was extended to one year for all women, regardless of length of service. At the same 
time, entitlement to Statutory Maternity Pay was extended to 39 weeks. Currently, the 
first six weeks are paid at 90 percent of earnings, and the remaining 33 weeks are paid 
at a flat rate of £117.18 per week. The flat rate is more than double what it was in 
1997.13 From 2010, paid maternity leave will be extended to one year.14 
                                                          
12
 http://www.ifs.org.uk/ff/childben.xls. 
13
 http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/Employees/WorkAndFamilies/DG_10029285. 
14 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statutory-notices/paternity-leave-pay.htm. The goal is to extend entitlements by 
the end of this Parliament, but the time of introduction has not been confirmed.  
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Parental leave, an unpaid, individual entitlement consisting of 13 weeks per parent, 
per child, was first introduced in December 1999.15 In contrast to maternity leave, 
which has been increasing in length and the generosity of payment, parental leave 
legislation complies with the minimum required by the EU Directive on Parental Leave, 
and goes little beyond it (Lewis and Campbell 2007). Leave can be taken in blocks or 
multiples of one week up until the child is aged five, but parents are not permitted to 
take more than four weeks of leave per calendar year. All employees with at least one 
year of continuous employment with their present employer, and who have, or expect to 
have, parental responsibility for a child are eligible.16 Consistent with its reluctance to 
impose strong regulations on the labour market or to interfere in ‘private matters’, the 
Government’s Summary Guidance states that ‘wherever possible employers and 
employees should make their own agreements about how parental leave will work in a 
particular workplace.’(Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform n.d.). 
Moreover, if employers ‘cannot cope’ they are permitted to postpone a period of leave 
for up to six months (Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform n.d.).  
Although rights to stay at home to care for a young child have been extended in 
recent years, the focus has been on providing longer and better paid maternity leaves. 
Rights for fathers to take leave have been far more limited, although since 2003 they 
have had the statutory right to two weeks paid paternity leave. In 2010, when paid 
maternity leave increases to one year, mothers will be able to transfer the last six 
months of their leave entitlement to fathers, who would be compensated at the flat rate. 
Not surprisingly, the Government expects take-up to be low. This policy approach, 
which is unique in Europe, reinforces the traditional gendered division of paid and 
unpaid work (Lewis and Campbell 2007).  
To facilitate the work-life balance of working parents, legislation was also 
introduced in 2003 that gives parents of children under the age of six (under 18 if the 
child is disabled) a right to request flexible work in existing jobs. From April 2007, this 
right to request was extended to those with caring responsibilities for adults as well 
(Himmelweit and Land 2007). This measure could serve to reduce some of the 
occupational segregation between full-time and part-time jobs. Research suggests that, 
thus far, the majority of requests for flexibility have been granted, although mothers are 
far more likely to make requests, and fathers are more than twice as likely to have their 
requests turned down (Palmer 2004; Holt and Grainger 2005; Lewis and Campbell 
2007). Other national evidence suggests the practice is limited, and only those who 
think their requests will be granted place a request in the first place (Manning and 
Petrongolo 2004). Likewise, local labour market studies suggest that flexible working 
                                                          
15
 http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/workandfamilies/parental-leave/index.html. 
16
 http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Parents/Moneyandworkentitlements/Parentalleaveandpay/DG_10029416. 
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arrangements are not widespread. Some firms have extended this right to all employees 
(Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 2005), but, as the scheme remains 
discretionary, the decisions that firms make are likely to vary with the state of the 
labour market. Furthermore, qualitative studies have reported that, in practice, the 
operation of flexibility on a day-to-day basis rests on decisions made by line managers, 
irrespective of formal company policy (Perrons 1999, Yeandle, Wigfield, Crompton 
and Dennett 2002, Standing 2006). 
 
 
4.2 Support for the care of children  
This section discusses recent policy changes, all explicitly aimed at providing better 
support to families with children. These include expanded provision of government 
subsidised childcare, as well as increased redistribution through cash transfers and 
changes to the tax system.  
In May 1998, the Government broke with a traditional reliance on the market to 
provide efficient levels of high quality child care and launched a National Childcare 
Strategy. The strategy aimed “to ensure good quality, affordable childcare for children 
aged 0 to 14 in every neighbourhood, including both formal childcare and support for 
informal arrangements.”17 Although it has been criticised for providing too few places 
to children under three (Rake 2001), there has been a substantial increase in the number 
of new childcare places made available since 1997.18 In addition, there has been an 
expansion in free early education for three- and four-year-olds. Currently, all four-year-
olds are guaranteed a free early education place if their parents want one, but the hours 
are part-time, and the minimum provision amounts to just 12.5 hours a week (Rake 
2001). Even with minimum hours set to increase19 to 15 by 2010, for many dual-earning 
families, taking up free early childcare means they must rely on a complex mix of 
formal, informal and back-up support both for care and transportation between care 
sites. Logistical requirements of this sort prevent some mothers from taking up paid 
work (Skinner 2003).  
In addition to measures aimed at facilitating work and motherhood, the 
government has also increased the cash support that it offers to parents, particularly 
those on low incomes. Child benefit is a universal cash payment made available to all 
children under the age of 16 and, from April 2006, to families with children aged 16, 
17, 18 and 19 who meet education or training requirements.20 The payment is made 
                                                          
17
 http://www.surestart.gov.uk/aboutsurestart/about/thesurestartprogramme2/challenge/. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ccmmanual/CCM18025.htm. 
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directly to the main care provider, usually the mother. As of April 2008, the benefit 
amounts to £18.80 per week for the eldest child, and £12.55 per week for each 
additional child.21 Compared to other EU-15 countries, the level of child benefit is not 
generous. Despite above inflation increases in recent years, a fairly recent comparative 
analysis placed the UK in the lower middle of the ranking for different amounts of 
household incomes, just above the four Southern European countries (de Henau et al. 
2002).  
In the late 1990s, the Government introduced a series of targeted tax reforms 
aimed at providing additional support to families with children. Key policies include an 
integrated refundable tax credit for out-of-work families and low-paid working families 
(with a supplement in the first year of a child’s life), and additional benefits for parents 
working 16 hours or more per week (the Working Tax Credit) (Brewer and Shephard 
2004). The effect of these policies has been to make the tax system increasingly less 
individualised, to increase the incomes of poor families with children, and to increase 
the number of households eligible for benefits (Sutherland 2005). More than three times 
as many working age adults were receiving tax credits in 2004/05 as were receiving 
what was then called the Family Credit in the early 1990s.22 While changes to the tax 
system have improved the financial situation of many families, there are concerns about 
the impact of these changes on gender equality. Because eligibility for tax credits is 
calculated at the household level, the system may tend to discourage second earners, 
usually the mother, from entering the labour market and accumulating work experience. 
Hence, tax credits may serve to reinforce the male breadwinning model, and force some 
women to make difficult choices about combining work and family (Brewer and 
Shephard 2004). 
Taken together, recent changes in both social policy and the labour market should 
provide limited help to women who want to combine work and childbearing. They 
should also work to lessen the economic costs of children. But, because the measures, 
unlike those in many other countries, tend to redistribute resources vertically rather than 
horizontally, any effects on fertility should disproportionately affect women on lower 
incomes.23 Because of a strong reliance on means testing and flat rate benefits, 
moderate- to high-earning women lose a higher proportion of their salary by taking 52 
weeks of maternity leave (thirteen weeks of which is unpaid and all but nine at a flat 
rate). They might be better able to afford the loss of earnings associated with maternity 
leave, but they still face the possibility of occupational downgrading due to weak 
                                                          
21
 http://www.ifs.org.uk/ff/childben.xls. 
22
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/key%20facts.shtml. 
23
 Horizontal redistribution takes place within income groups. It is also sometimes used to refer to 
redistribution over the life cycle. An example would be Bismarkian-type social insurance policies that tend to 
be status-preserving. In contrast, vertical redistribution is from the rich to the poor (Bonoli 1997). 
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regulations about the right to return (those taking more than six months are only 
promised the right to return to a similar job) (Lewis and Campbell 2007) and may still 
face long-term part-time pay penalties if they request and are granted part-time hours 
(Francesconi and Gosling 2004). In that sense, the financial costs for those who are 
better off could be far greater. Increased economic support for children in general 
should improve the economic circumstances of families with children, but, again, the 
effect on higher-income families (and those families who do want to adhere to a 
traditional gendered division of labour) should be relatively small.  
 
 
5. Social and political changes affecting fertility  
5.1 The labour market  
The labour market in the United Kingdom is characterised by high activity and 
employment rates for both men and women, and, even taking into account recent 
changes in family policy discussed above, low levels of labour market regulation 
relative to the rest of Europe (Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2005; Himmelweit and Land 
2007). Participation rates in England and Wales exceed the Lisbon targets for female 
employment (Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2005). Unemployment rates have halved from 
10 percent in the early 1990s, to five percent between 2001 and 2005 (Figure 9), and 
long-term unemployment has fallen by more than 80 percent since 1997. The 
proportion of children living in workless households has also fallen by 2.6 percent since 
1997 (Sutherland 2005).  
Head count rates of employment for women and men are high, although these 
figures mask a good deal of heterogeneity. Chronic unemployment remains a problem 
for some individuals, and figures from 2004 show that two-fifths of the long-term 
unemployed who enter work find themselves out of work again within six months.24 
The activity rates of women have been rising over time, but both levels and rates of 
growth differ substantially by the age of the youngest child and by the presence of a 
partner (Figure 10), as well as by ethnic group (Sigle-Rushton and Perrons 2006). 
Mothers with small children have far lower participation and employment rates than 
other women, and this is particularly the case for women living outside of a partnership. 
For example, the employment rate of lone mothers in the United Kingdom was just over 
55 percent in 2004, up from 44 percent in 1996 (Sutherland 2005). Only the 
Netherlands has such a small percentage of lone mothers reporting employment or self-
                                                          
24
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/key%20facts.shtml. 
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employment. This percentage is also small relative to the general population of women 
age 25–49, of whom 72 percent report their main activity status as employed or self-
employed (Eurostat 2004). 
Despite their increased presence in the labour market, mothers continue to 
reconcile work and family by engaging in part-time work, and often only after children 
have entered school. Relative to other European countries, part-time jobs are more 
occupationally and vertically segregated. For example, in 2003–04, nearly one-quarter 
of women part-time workers in Great Britain were shop assistants, care assistants or 
cleaners (versus 7.7 percent of full-time workers). In contrast, only four percent of part-
time (versus 15 percent of full-time) working women were managers or senior officials 
(Manning and Petrongolo 2004). Although the gender pay gap for full-time workers is 
not extremely wide, part-time workers face a good deal of occupational segregation, 
and an extremely large part-time pay penalty. As a consequence, many women (and 
some men) trade flexible hours for low-paid and low-skill jobs. Of the 5.5 million 
working age adults who earned less than £6.50 per hour in 2004, nearly two-thirds were 
women and half were part-time workers.25 Moreover, there is concern that this has 
resulted in an inefficient utilization of skills, because a high percentage of part-time 
workers report working below their potential (Darton and Hurrell 2005; Equal 
Opportunities Commission 2005). Hence, relative to other countries, the gap in earnings 
between mothers and childless women, sometimes termed the “motherhood gap”, is 
high, and does not narrow appreciably as children get older (Sigle-Rushton and 
Waldfogel 2007). 
Equal opportunity legislation is fairly strong, but the substantive effects for those 
whose work patterns deviate from the standard male model are somewhat limited. The 
Part-Time (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations, which aim to secure 
parity between part-time and full-time workers in terms of holiday entitlements, sick 
pay and pensions, were introduced in 2000. Their potential to reduce the part-time pay 
gap is weakened by the degree of occupational and job segregation between full-time 
and part-time workers, which makes it difficult to find comparable workers in order to 
make a case for unfair or discriminatory treatment (Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2006). 
As long as the labour market remains highly segregated, women’s access to well-paying 
jobs will be limited, unless they are willing and able to work full-time.  
 
                                                          
25 http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/key_facts.htm Low pay is also strongly associated with qualification 
levels. 
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Figure 9: Unemployment rates of working aged women and men, by age group  
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 Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, author’s calculations. 
 Note: The sample includes women aged 15 to 59 and men aged 15–64 to reflect statutory retirement age, which differs by sex. 
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In order to address high rates of relative poverty and child poverty, the 
Government has, in recent years, implemented a wide range of new policy measures, 
some of which should address gender inequalities in the labour market. As Sutherland 
(2005) suggests, the approach can best be summarised as an attempt to reduce poverty 
without creating incentives for inactivity. Some of the more important measures include 
the introduction of a national minimum wage, and the introduction of the New Deal 
employment activation programmes. The latter, however, have tended to focus 
resources on groups of unemployed in which men are overrepresented (Rake 2001). 
Overall, the Government has increased the amount of support offered to the low paid 
(with a stronger emphasis on families with children), but it has been more radical in its 
reforms to the income tax system, and more cautious in its efforts to impose additional 
regulations on the labour market.  
The first legislation for a national minimum wage was passed in 1998. It took 
effect in April 1999, and has worked to raise the wages of the lowest paid, the majority 
of whom were women and part-time workers. Concerns about the costs it would impose 
on businesses and the effect it might have on unemployment rates meant that the main 
rate was originally set at a fairly low £3.60 per hour (with a lower youth rate of £3.00 
per hour) (Low Pay Commission 2000). However, it has been raised in each subsequent 
year, and, as of October 2007, stands at £5.52 per hour (with a lower development rate 
for 18–21 year olds of £4.60 per hour, and an even lower rate for 16–17 year olds of 
£3.40 per hour).26 Set nationally, it remains well below a ‘living wage’ in more 
expensive areas like London (Greater London Authority 2005). Despite the lower youth 
rate, which is meant to encourage employers to hire the youngest workers, 
unemployment rates for those aged 15 to 24 remain high, particularly for males (Figure 
9). Inactivity rates remain high for young people as well (Bynner and Parsons 1999; 
Rennison, Maguire, Middleton and Ashworth 2005). 
 
 
5.2 The gender division of unpaid work  
As discussed above, the economic and policy context creates incentives for a 
specialised gender division of paid and unpaid work, especially for families with 
children. What about actual behaviour? Data from the UK Time Use Survey show that, 
although total time spent on paid and unpaid work is similar for women and men, 
fathers report spending twice as much time in paid employment during the week, and 
mothers spend nearly twice as much time on unpaid work and caring. Mothers are 
responsible for 75 percent of the time spent on childcare during the week, and around 
                                                          
26 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/nmw/#b. 
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two-thirds of the time spent on weekends. Having children increases the demand for 
time for housework and care, but the extra work continues to be disproportionately 
shouldered by women.27 
 
Figure 10: Activity rates of women aged 20–45, by partnership status and age of  
 youngest child, 1993-2005  
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  Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, author’s calculations. 
                                                          
27
 http://www.eoc.org.uk/PDF/time_use_and_childcare.pdf. 
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5.3 Fertility intentions  
Data on fertility intentions collected between 1998 and 2001 suggest that, although 
average intended family size has declined, and the percentage of women aged 18–23 
who intend to remain childless or have only one child has grown since the 1979–1981 
period, the proportion of women intending to have exactly two children has remained 
remarkably stable (Table 9). The two-child norm appears to be strongly entrenched, and 
a lowest low fertility future, whereby the TFR falls below 1.3 children per women 
(Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002), is not in line with stated intentions (Smallwood and 
Jefferies 2003). Of course, the relationship between intentions and actual behaviour is 
extremely complex. It is likely that intentions will change – upwards and downwards – 
over time (McDonald 2002). In addition, unexpected fertility is not uncommon. 
Although more than two in five recent parents reported that their pregnancies were 
unplanned (Joshi et al. 2004), suggesting that a good many births were not intended or 
were poorly timed, fertility intentions tend to consistently exceed actual future fertility. 
This is especially true for childless women (Berrington 2004).  
Data in Table 9 show that, although nearly one in five of the oldest women in the 
most recent wave of data are childless, only about 15 percent intended to remain 
childless. Birth statistics from England and Wales show similar proportions of 
childlessness for women aged 36–38 in 1998, 2000 and 2001 (Office for National 
Statistics 2006). Data from recent years suggest that only one to two percent of women 
who were childless at that time managed to have a child. In other words, about one-
quarter of childless women in their mid- to late-thirties still thought they would have a 
first birth, but only about 10 percent managed to do so by 2005. A gap between 
intentions and outcomes can also be observed when we consider women aged 21–23 in 
1979–1981 (birth cohort 1956–60), who reported that they intended to have about 2.23 
children on average (Smallwood and Jefferies 2003). Those women would be aged 45–
49 in 2005, and with nearly completed fertility. The completed family size for this 
cohort ranges from 1.98 (the 1959 and 1960 cohort) to 2.02 (1956 cohort), suggesting 
that fertility intentions exceeded actual fertility by about 10 percent (Office for National 
Statistics 2006).  
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Table 9: Intended parity distribution and mean number of children 
 in England and Wales using cross-sectional data collected  
 between 1979 and 2001, women between the ages of 18 and 38  
 
Intended partity for 
respondents stating their 
intentions (percentages) 
0 1 2 3 4+Year(s) of data  
collection  age
     
No intention
Stated
(percent)
Mean number 
Of children 
intended
Completed 
fertility, of 
those with an 
intention N
1979–81 
 
18–20 5 3 59 20 13 20 2.35 0.18 1586
 
21–23 5 6 59 21 9 18 2.23 0.59 1612
 
24–26 6 8 59 18 7 21 2.12 1.07 1609
 
27–29 7 11 55 19 8 19 2.12 1.55 1638
 
30–32 7 11 52 21 10 19 2.19 1.96 1848
 
33–35 7 13 49 21 10 11 2.19 2.12 1849
 
36–38 8 12 42 24 14 9 2.32 2.29 1552
1988–90 
 
18–20 5 7 58 20 10 7 2.25 0.19 1259
 
21–23 5 8 57 21 9 6 2.23 0.48 1348
 
24–26 5 10 55 22 8 7 2.19 0.82 1505
 
27–29 6 11 51 23 8 5 2.20 1.33 1475
 
30–32 9 13 47 22 10 6 2.14 1.65 1390
 
33–35 10 12 45 22 11 6 2.13 1.83 1350
 
36–38 10 13 46 21 11 4 2.14 2.03 1305
1998, 2000–2001 
 
18–20 9 12 54 18 7 4 2.05 0.23 761
 
21–23 7 10 57 17 9 3 2.14 0.42 744
 
24–26 10 11 55 18 5 3 1.99 0.69 874
 
27–29 8 14 52 18 7 2 2.04 1.07 1081
 
30–32 10 14 50 19 7 3 2.01 1.35 1211
 
33–35 13 13 46 19 9 1 2.01 1.65 1343
  
36–38 15 17 40 19 9 1 1.93 1.80 1279
 
Source: Smallwood and Jefferies (2003). 
Note: The higher proportion of women not stating an intention in the 1979–81 period is because uncertain respondents were not 
further probed as they were in later waves. 
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5.4 Family support  
The rapid social and demographic changes that have taken place in England and Wales 
should have important implications for family support networks. Increased longevity 
and lower fertility have worked to reduce the size of each generation, while at the same 
time increasing the number of generations alive at any one time (Bengtson, Rosenthal 
and Burton 1990). Indeed, Dench, Ogg and Thompson (1999) showed that three-
quarters of British respondents were part of a three-, four- or even five-generation 
family group. This suggests more potential for support across generations than within 
them. 
Using a somewhat dated (1988/89) sample of British adults aged 55–75, Grundy 
(2005) shows that at least two-thirds of parents reported having regular or frequent 
intergenerational exchange between themselves and their children. Parents were more 
likely to report providing than receiving support, with childcare and domestic help 
being the most commonly reported forms of assistance. That a high percentage of 
parents reported providing help with childcare is not surprising given that childcare at 
that time was often expensive and in short supply. These findings suggest that regular 
or frequent intergenerational support, the most common of which requires contact, is 
relatively common, even if co-residence is not (Pampel 1992; Grundy 2000). Despite 
the increasing geographical dispersal of family members, working parents – for a 
combination of reasons related to preferences and cost constraints – rely to a great 
extent on informal childcare provided by grandparents (Woodland, Miller and Tipping 
2002). Hence, for many working parents, private solutions have been found to allow 
them to combine work and childbearing. Attempts to increase the employment rates of 
older people, if successful, may remove this option for some families, increasing the 
costs of childbearing.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
Despite recent demographic and social changes, and despite limited levels of support 
for families with children, fertility in England and Wales has remained high and stable 
relative to much of Europe. Like its European neighbours, England and Wales has seen 
an increasing percentage of young people continuing their education beyond the 
compulsory level; a more protracted transition to adulthood; an increase in female 
labour market participation; the postponement of marriage and fertility; and the wide 
acceptance of contraceptive methods, including abortion. In contrast to most other 
countries in the “high fertility belt” (Sobotka 2004), the government has been reluctant 
to implement policies to encourage childbearing, and many of its policies aimed at 
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supporting families with children reinforce a traditional gendered division of labour. In 
this context, women may find it difficult to combine (full-time, well-paid) work and 
childbearing. Put simply, fertility appears to have remained stable despite, rather than 
because of, government actions. 
Do the findings in this chapter suggest that policy can do little to influence 
fertility, and that generous support for families as we see in other European countries 
with similar levels of fertility is unnecessary? Given that the challenges of population 
ageing appear to be benign relative to lowest-low fertility countries like Italy (Dixon 
and Margo 2006), perhaps policies to support fertility now and in the future are not 
needed. A closer look at the timing and the quantum of the fertility of sub-groups 
suggests that the answer, at least in the longer term, might be no. In recent years, 
fertility has remained high relative to much of Europe, in part because specific sub-
groups of the population have high rates of fertility (e.g. certain ethnic groups, 
immigrants), or have not changed their fertility behaviour (e.g. the low-educated). The 
fertility of teenagers and women with low levels of education have helped to keep 
period total fertility rates stable in recent years. The low-educated, in particular, are 
more likely to have children and to have larger families. The social polarization of 
fertility by education level and occupational class – which, despite similar levels of 
fertility, is stronger than in France (Ekert-Jaffe et al. 2002) - suggests that better-
educated and more economically secure women are having either small families or no 
families, while those with fewer outside opportunities and less economic stability are 
accounting for the shortfall. Increased financial support in recent years may have 
offered the latter some compensation for the costs of reproduction. But the laissez-faire 
approach to fertility issues in general, and to labour market interventions in particular, 
may well have made the combination of work and motherhood too difficult for other 
groups women.  
Current Government strategies include cutting rates of teenage parenthood (Social 
Exclusion Unit 1999), increasing and widening participation in higher education 
(Department for Education and Skills 2003), reducing occupational segregation by 
encouraging women to move into traditionally male occupations (Trade and Industry 
Committee 2005), increasing the education and skill levels of the immigration stream,28 
and addressing poor employment opportunities at the lower end of the socio-economic 
scale.29 If the Government meets these goals, but does so without paying more attention 
to the economic costs and consequences of childbearing for all families, the result may 
well be a less benign, lower fertility future.  
                                                          
28 
“Immigration points system begins” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7269790.stm.  
29 
“Skills drive 'to boost workforce'” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/7097125.stm.  
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